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A Comparative Analysis of the Regulation of State and
Provincial Governments in NAFTA and GATT/WTO
Edward T. Hayes*
I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the
proliferation of regional free trade areas have brought trade liberalization to
economic disciplines reaching farther and deeper into the sovereign heart of
nation-states. While this growth is generally perceived as a natural progression
with worldwide economic and welfare benefits, it is increasingly reaching into
areas within the constitutional competence of state and provincial governments
in federal nation-states. As such, state and provincial actors are in an increasingly
better position to influence world trade, both positively and negatively.
This Article reviews the manner in which international trade regimes
regulate state and provincial behavior by comparing and contrasting the "federal
clauses" of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA' ) and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")/WTO. Section II provides
an overview of the current aggressive trade agenda and how subfederal actors in
the United States and Canada are becoming increasingly involved in trade issues,
with potential negative ramifications for the international trade system. Section
III explores the constitutional distribution of powers in the United States and
Canada and how this impacts the international trade system. Section IV
examines the history of GATT/WTO and NAFTA efforts to regulate federal
nation-states, including a look at relevant international dispute settlement
decisions. Section V concludes with a summary of the challenges facing
international regulation of federal nation-states and recommendations for
improving regulation in this area.
LLM 2004, with distinction, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC; JD 1998,
cum laude, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans, LA.
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11. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ENVIRONMENT
NAFTA recently enjoyed its tenth anniversary with all the fanfare one
might expect for an international trade agreement understood by few outside of
Washington, D.C. That is not to say, however, that NAFTA's anniversary went
unnoticed and without reflection on its political and economic impact. In a
somewhat scathing economic analysis, Joseph E. Stiglitz opined that Mexico has
failed to realize numerous benefits promised at the outset of the treaty,' which
now serves as an unfair benchmark for future regional trade agreements. In a
more fundamental critical analysis, Senator Charles Schumer and Paul Roberts
utilized NAFTA's anniversary as an occasion to question the continuing viability
of global trade liberalization in general, arguing that the economic theory of
comparative advantage is no longer tenable in light of the free cross-border
movement of factors of production. 2
While there are certainly varying opinions regarding the distorting effects
of regional trade agreements and the continuing efficacy of the traditional
economic theory of comparative advantage, there is no question that
globalization is here to stay. As Thomas Friedman aptly described it:
I feel about globalization a lot like I feel about the dawn. Generally
speaking, I think it's a good thing that the sun comes up every morning. It
does more good than harm, especially if you wear sunscreen and sunglasses.
But even if I didn't much care for the dawn there isn't much I could do
about it.3
Despite recent calls for reversion to protectionism, the general consensus is
that globalization should be embraced and used as a platform for new and
innovative economic development. China is an example of a country that has
embraced globalization and utilized its entry into the WTO as an opportunity for
economic and political reforms.4 Russia is another country that is seeking entry
into the WTO in order to take full advantage of the economic benefits
associated with global trade.5
As globalization continues, it is important to consider how far and deep
trade liberalization should go. With respect to NAFTA, most commentators
1 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Broken Promise ofNAFTA, NY Times A23 (Jan 6, 2004).
2 Charles Schumer and Paul Craig Roberts, Second Thoughts on Free Trade, NY Times A23 (Jan 6,
2004).
3 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree xxi-xxii (Anchor 2000).
4 Donald C. Clarke, China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospectsfor Compliance, 2 Wash U Global
Studies L Rev 97, 106 (2003).
5 See, for example, No Champagne Reception for U.S. Investors in Russia: Interview with Andrew Somers,
President, American Chamber of Commerce in Russia, Prime-Tass English-language Bus Newswire
(Aug 7, 2003).
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agree that it already goes exceptionally far in terms of trade liberalization,
particularly in light of its supplemental side agreements on labor and
environment. Despite the fact that the labor and environmental side agreements
lack substance, they represent a genuine first effort to liberalize areas that touch
the very sovereign heart of nation-states. The WTO appears to be following in
NAFTA's footsteps towards greater inclusion of and more liberalization in
nontraditional areas. The Doha Round of trade negotiations includes discussions
on twenty-one subjects, including new topics and expansion or readjustment of
existing disciplines. The Doha agenda represents an aggressive attempt to
further trade liberalization in such areas as services, investment, competition,
environment, and labor. In fact, Doha's optimistic agenda is likely the cause of
the current WTO stalemate, evidenced by the recent Cancun ministerial which
ended without agreement amid protests by developing countries that perhaps
felt that the agenda was moving too fast. These developing countries are
demanding greater market access and removal of trade barriers in agriculture, a
sore subject in the United States and Europe.
Despite what some perceive as shortcomings in NAFTA's side agreements
and the current WTO lethargy, it is clear that world trade is evolving into new
areas that touch not only the sovereign heart of nation-states, but also areas
within the constitutional prerogative of subnational governmental units. For
example, the WTO effort to reach a single understanding on trade in services
raises concerns regarding the political autonomy of subnational governments
insofar as most services are regulated at the state and provincial level. Areas such
as investment, labor, and the environment raise similar concerns because they
are often subject to significant subnational authority.
Even though the United States federal government retains significant
power over foreign affairs, including foreign commerce, the states do enjoy
some measure of autonomy in certain areas affecting foreign commerce, such as
services and the environment. Moreover, as will be discussed in Section II(A),
recent United States Supreme Court decisions and evolving notions of
sovereignty foretell a resurgence in states' rights in foreign affairs and commerce.
Canada's federal system is quite different in that it has a fairly weak federal
tradition and extensive provincial authority over issues impacting foreign affairs
and commerce. Thus, Canada's system poses an even greater risk to trade
liberalization. One commentator aptly summarized Canada's participation in the
evolving international trade system as follows:
In the area of international trade treaties, Canada has been able to muddle
through most of the past six decades largely because trade treaties focused
primarily on areas of federal jurisdiction. However, the NAFTA, the GAlIT,
and the World Trade Organization's future agenda have all demonstrated
Winter 2005
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that international trade liberalization now affects all kinds of areas that are
near and dear to the jurisdiction of the provinces. 6
There is no question that state and provincial governments are now better
positioned to participate in and affect international trade. For example, from
1982 to 1994, state governments in the United States nearly tripled their number
of overseas offices for "trade, investment, and tourism promotion purposes,
operating nearly 150 offices overseas at the beginning of 1993 . . . . 7 As of 1990,
eight Canadian provinces maintained overseas offices, spending more on
international trade activities than the state governments in the United States. 8 In
addition to direct market participation, state and provincial governments are
now in a unique position to negatively impact trade liberalization through
protectionist measures that either fall beyond the reach of current world trade
rules or require initiation of a dispute settlement mechanism to rectify.
As an economic matter, nonconforming state and provincial measures can
significantly "diminish welfare gains" sought through trade liberalization. 9 For
example, several states in the United States represent populations greater than
many nations in the world. California and New York represent massive
economies with the potential to negatively affect millions outside of the United
States through protectionist measures. 10 The reality of this threat is evident in
the antiliberalization comments of New York Senator Charles Schumer cited
earlier.11 The threat of nonconforming local measures is also evident in the
recent United States presidential election debate, where significant job losses and
the highest trade deficit in history have fueled protectionist rhetoric and even
some calls for a wholesale review of all current international trade agreements.
The current aggressive trade agenda and evolving notions of sovereignty
over foreign affairs and commerce in some federal nation-states require a
reassessment of how international trade agreements regulate state and provincial
conduct. The key question to consider is whether international trade institutions
are capable of responding to an increase in protectionist or nonconforming
behavior at the state and provincial level. One prominent scholar framed the
issue in the context of the United States federal system and GATT as "whether
the General Agreement actually obligates the federal governments to make state
6 James P. Mcllroy, NAFTA and the Canadian Provinces: Two Ships Passing in the Night?, 23 Can-US
LJ 431, 438 (1997).
7 Earl H. Fry, Sovereignty and Federalism: U.S. and Canadian Perspeclives Challenges to Sovereigny and
Governance, 20 Can-US LJ 303, 309 (1994).
8 Id at 310.
9 Matthew Schaefer, Searching for Pareto Gains in the Relationship Between Free Trade and Federalism:
Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing the FTAA, 23 Can-US LJ 441, 448-49 (1997).
10 Id.
1 See Schumer and Roberts, Second Thoughts, NY Times at A23 (cited in note 2).
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governments comply with GATT rules. If not, then state law inconsistent with
GATT rules will not actually be in conflict with US obligations under GATT.' 12
The importance of this question was recently summarized from both the
multilateral and regional trade perspectives.
If a multilateral or regional arrangement is to maximize the attainment of its
goals, it must apply to and be complied with by governmental actors at all
levels. There is both a political and economic element behind the drive to
bind sub-national governments to obligations within trade agreements from
the "international" perspective. A long-standing controversy in international
treaty-making between unitary and federal states has been the extent to
which component unit governments in federal states should be bound. To
the extent federal states sought to exclude application of an international
agreement to their component unit governments, unitary states complained
of an "imbalance" in obligations. As a result, unitary governments might be
less likely to enter into certain agreements or seek to reduce their level of
obligations. Within the trade agreement context, such consequences hinder
the attainment of maximum welfare gains. 13
The GATT/WTO has multiple provisions addressing federal members in
its various agreements, each modeled after the Article XXIV:12 federal clause of
GATT 1947, which requires each member to take such ."reasonable measures"
as "may be available to it" to ensure observance by regional and local
governments. 14 NAFTA also contains multiple provisions addressing the
distribution of power in its federal parties, all modeled after the Article 105
federal clause, which requires the parties to take "all necessary measures" to
ensure observance of the agreement's provisions by state and provincial
governments.' 5 Both the GATT/WTO and NAFTA federal clauses are subject
to varying interpretations as to whether and to what extent they actually obligate
the federal governments to force state or provincial compliance. The next
Section of this Article explores the various interpretations of the federal clauses
in the context of the domestic distribution of powers in the United States and
Canada.
12 Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the United States, in Meinhard
Hilf, Francis G. Jacobs, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, eds, 4 The European Communily and
GATT 187, 219 (Kluwer 1986).
13 See Schaefer, 23 Can-US LJ at 448 (cited in note 9).
14 See The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), art XXIV:12, in The Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 525 (GATT Secretariat 1994)
(hereinafter GATT 1947).
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III. DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COMMERCE
POWER IN NAFTA's FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS
Generally speaking, the distribution of power over foreign affairs and
commerce in federal constitutional systems is an evolutionary process, with
central and local prerogatives changing with the political tide. Currently, federal
political systems exist in an international climate notable for significant changes
in traditional notions of sovereignty, resulting partially from the increasing
internationalism of subfederal governmental units. While some scholars are
questioning the traditional notion of Westphalian sovereignty as it relates to
nation-states, 6 others question the continuing viability of traditional domestic
sovereignty as it relates to subfederal governmental entities, which are slowly
replacing central governments as the dominant force in foreign affairs and
commerce.1 7 Regardless of whether one adheres to traditional or modern
notions of sovereignty, there is no doubt that state and provincial governments
have a significant role to play in the new international economic system. Exactly
what that role is, and how the international system reacts to it, remains to be
seen. With this background, the distribution of foreign affairs and commerce
power in the United States and Canada will now be examined.
A. UNITED STATES
The United States federal government enjoys a near monopoly over the
states with respect to foreign affairs and commerce. The Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."'1 8 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the
Commerce Clause "limits the power of the States to erect barriers against
interstate trade"'19 and has extended that power into a dormant foreign
commerce doctrine emphasizing the importance that the United States "speak[]
with one voice" when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments. 20The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution affords supremacy to
16 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept
, 
97 Am J Intl L 782,
786 (2003); Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignt7 Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J Intl
Econ L 841 (2003).
17 Peter J. Spiro, Globali!ation and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 Ohio St L J 649, 668-69
(2002).
18 US Const, art I, § 8, cl 3.
19 Lewis v BT Investment Managers, Inc, 447 US 27, 35 (1980).
20 Japan Line, Lid v County of Los Angeles, 441 US 434, 453 (1979).
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all federal laws enacted under the commerce power, including international trade
treaties.21
Despite its various constitutional delegations of power, the federal
government's authority over foreign affairs and commerce is not inviolable. One
important limitation on all federal power is the Tenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." 22 The Tenth Amendment's
limitation on federal power has been subject to varying interpretations by the
Supreme Court. As an appointed political institution, the Supreme Court's view
on state power over foreign affairs and commerce has been subject to change
over the years. Despite the ongoing validity of cases such as Lewis and Japan Line,
some scholars believe the current Rehnquist Court is softening the "default" rule
against state activity implicating foreign affairs and commerce. 23 This trend
began with decisions involving domestic interstate commerce issues, culminating
in the Court's landmark decision in United States v Lope.7 where it struck down a
federal statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause for the first time since
1937. 24
To some extent, the Court's domestic trend has extended to states' rights
in matters involving foreign affairs and commerce. Arguably the most important
decision was handed down in 1994 in Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board,
which upheld a California multinational corporate tax scheme conflicting with a
federal corporate tax scheme. 25 Some commentators view the Barclay decision as
a direct attack on the Japan Line "one voice" theory, while others even suggest
that it signals the end of all dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrines. 26 The
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council
somewhat dimmed the spirits of states' rights commentators by invalidating a
Massachusetts law restricting state purchases of goods and services from entities
doing business with the Union of Myanmar (Burma).27 While Crosby did
invalidate the state procurement law at issue, it did so on very narrow
21 US Const, art Vi, cl 2.
22 US Const, amend X.
23 See Spiro, 63 Ohio St L J at 695 (cited in note 17). See also James J. Pascoe, Time for a New
Approach? Federalism and Foreign Affairs After Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 35 Vand
J Transnatl L 291, 304 (2002).
24 514 US 549, 567 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as not involving
an economic activity substantially affecting interstate commerce).
25 512 US 298, 302-03 (1994).
26 See Spiro, 63 Ohio St L J at 695 (cited in note 17); Jack Goldsmith, Statutoy Foreign Affairs
Preemplion, 2000 S Ct Rev 175, 212; Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and
Federalism, 83 Va L Rev 1617, 1700 (1997).
27 530 US 363, 388 (2000).
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preemption grounds; the Court refused to address the law's efficacy under
foreign affairs or foreign commerce doctrines. 28 Because of the Court's narrow
holding and refusal to address the broader issues, many commentators believe
the door remains open for state participation in areas implicating foreign affairs
and commerce.29 The Court's most recent decision in American Insurance
Association v Garamendi also failed to address substantive foreign commerce issues
by voiding the California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 199930
solely under an implied preemption theory.
31
In sum, while the role of the United States federal government in foreign
affairs and commerce remains significantly superior to that of the states, recent
Supreme Court cases signify a trend towards greater state participation in this
area. This constitutional development, coupled with greater direct state
interaction with foreign governments and the expanding trade agenda, place
state governments in an important position to influence the direction and role of
international trade liberalization in the future.
B. CANADA
The distribution of powers over foreign affairs and commerce in Canada is
quite different than the United States. Canada's Constitution was drafted when
Canada was a British colony and all international treaties were negotiated by
Britain.32 The Canadian Constitution is "silent on the treaty implementation
power of the [federal] government," addressing only the federal government's
power to implement treaties entered into by the British government.33 The
landmark 1936 decision in the Labor Conventions case clarified that, while the
Canadian federal government has the ability to enter into international trade
agreements, Section 132 of the 1867 British North America Act does not
provide the federal government with the ability to implement such agreements.
34
Rather, the Canadian Constitution allocates implementation power to both the
federal and provincial governments.
In order to determine the appropriate governing authority, one must first
examine the substantive subject matter of the discipline at issue. Although there
28 Id at 374 n 8.
29 See Spiro, 63 Ohio St L J at 696 (cited in note 17). See also, Pascoe, 35 Vand J Transnatl L at
318 (cited in note 23).
30 Cal Ins Code §§13800-807 (West 2003).
31 539 US 396, 401 (2003).
32 See Mcllroy, 23 Can-US L J at 433 (cited in note 6).
33 Id.
34 AG Canada vAG Ontario, [1937] 1 DLR 673, 682 (Jan 28, 1937) (stating that Canada's federal
government does not have the ability to implement international labor convention that
substantively falls within provincial legislative jurisdiction under the Constitution).
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is no precise delimitation, Section 92 of the Constitution Act of 1867 maps out
certain areas within provincial jurisdiction, many of which pose potential hurdles
to international trade regulation. Examples include provincial authority over
procurement, export subsidies, alcohol, labor, and certain agricultural issues.
There is no clear distinction between federal and provincial spheres of
jurisdiction over foreign affairs and commerce in Canada. As a result, the federal
government does not enjoy broad foreign affairs and commerce power and does
not have a dormant foreign commerce doctrine like in the United States. 35 The
end result is that Canadian provinces are in a better constitutional position than
the state governments in the United States to directly participate in foreign
affairs and commerce and to negatively impact the trade liberalizing goals of
international trade agreements.
IV. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FEDERAL NATION-
STATES
Customary international law imposes responsibility on federal nation-states
for acts or omissions of their component governmental units that violate
international obligations of the nation-states.36 This obligation exists even where
the internal law of the federal nation-state does not provide authority to compel
compliance by its component governmental units. 37  These customary
international rules apply unless a contrary intention is evidenced in the text of
the international treaty.38 Thus, the first question one must ask when examining
the international regulation of federal nation-states is whether the international
treaty language evidences an intention to "opt out" of the default rule of nation-
state responsibility for subfederal governmental units. 'While there was some
early doubt with respect to the intentions of the Contracting Parties in GATT,
there is now no question that federal GATT/WTO Members and NAFTA
Parties remain fully responsible for the actions of their component
governmental units.3 9 However, there is no international customary law rule
regarding what measures, if any, central governments must take to seek
compliance at the local level. The GATT/WTO and NAFTA contain dissimilar
provisions regarding what remedial action federal governments must undertake
35 See Schaefer, 23 Can-US LJ at 460 (cited in note 9).
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Jan 27, 1980), arts 27, 29, 1155 UNTS 331, 339
(1987) ("Vienna Convention").
37 Id, art 27. See also Schaefer, 23 Can-US LJ at 462-63 (cited in note 9).
38 Vienna Convention, art 29 (cited in note 36). See also, Anthony Aust, Modem Treay Law and
Practice 160 (Cambridge 2000).
39 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Understanding of the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article
XXIV:12, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 34 (cited in note 14).
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to ensure compliance at the local level. This distinction significantly separates the
two international trade agreements and is the basis of the remaining discussion
in this Article.
A. GATT/WTO REGULATION OF FEDERAL MEMBERS
The GATT/WTO system is the earliest example of an international trade
treaty regulating federal nation-states. To one degree or another it has influenced
and served as the basis of international regulation in subsequent trade treaties. It
is therefore appropriate to begin with an analysis of the GATT/WTO regulatory
system. All of the NAFTA parties are also WTO members and played integral
parts in the early development of the GATT/WTO provisions discussed herein.
The GATT/WTO federal clause directly descends from the early GATT
and International Trade Organization ("ITO") negotiations following World
War 11.40 The negotiators foresaw the unique problem federal nation-states
posed to international governance. To prevent, or at least minimize, potential
trade distortions inherent in federal forms of government, the negotiators
searched for ways to "convince" federal governments to ensure compliance at
the local level. As noted previously in this Section, federal nation-states have a
customary international law obligation of responsibility for acts or omissions of
their subfederal governmental units. The early GATT negotiating history
illustrates a genuine struggle to balance this customary international law
obligation with the political reality of federal nation-states which, to one extent
or another, may lack sufficient constitutional authority to require observance at
the local level.
Australia initially voiced its concern with respect to the draft National
Treatment rule on internal taxes. Australia noted that there were "[d]ifferences in
treatment of domestic and imported goods" in both the Commonwealth and
individual States, but that it would nevertheless agree to use its "best efforts"
over time to bring such measures into compliance. 41 A United States negotiator
raised a similar concern regarding the draft government procurement rule,
tentatively stating that although procurement generally involved both federal and
state governments, the United States might be able to control the actions of
states. 42 Reporting on these concerns, a technical subcommittee noted that
although "[s]everal countries emphasized that central governments could not in
many cases control subsidiary governments in this regard," they nevertheless
"agreed that all should take such measures as might be open to them to ensure
40 John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 Mich
L Rev 250, 304-05 (1967).
41 UN Doc EPCT/C.II/5 at 1 (1946).
42 UN Doc EPCT/C.II.27 at 1 (1946).
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the objective. '43 The technical subcommittee recommended the addition of a
clause to the National Treatment article accounting for this reality. The
proposed article required that the parties take "all measures" open to them to
ensure fair application of taxes and other regulations by subcentral governments
within their territories. 44
Without explanation in the negotiating history, the "all measures" language
was later altered to charge the parties with taking "such reasonable measures as
may be available" to ensure observance by local governments.45 The "federal
clause" was also moved from the National Treatment article to a general
miscellaneous article, reflecting the application of the "federal clause" to other
GATT substantive provisions. 46 The change from "all measures" to "reasonable
measures" is significant and, although no explanation is given in the preparatory
history for the alteration, there is evidence that several countries attempted to
strengthen the "reasonable measures" language during the negotiations.47
The negotiators finally adopted the language contained in GATT Article
XXIV:12, which provides that "[e]ach contracting party shall take such
reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the
provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and
authorities within its territories. '48 Throughout GATT's application under the
Protocol of Provisional Application, Article XXIV:12 was generally considered
to contain inherent ambiguities allowing for two divergent interpretations. 49 One
interpretation was that certain matters in federal systems are within the
constitutional prerogative of subfederal entities and beyond the control of the
central government. In those situations, the central government would not be in
violation of its GATT obligations when subfederal entities enact nonconforming
measures, as long as the central government does everything in its power to seek
compliance.50
A second interpretation was that GATT was not intended to apply to
subfederal governments at all, and even where the central government has the
authority to force compliance, it is under no obligation to do so but merely to
43 UN Doc EPCT/C.IJ/54 at 4 (1946).
44 Id at 6.
45 Jackson, 66 Mich L Rev at 306 (cited in note 40).
46 Id.
47 See EPCT/TAC/PV/19 at 33; E/CONF.2/C.6/12.
48 GAT 1947, art XXIV:12 (cited in note 14).
49 See Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT at 219-221 (cited in note 12). See also John H. Jackson,
William J. Davey, and Alan 0. Sykes, Jr., eds, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations:
Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnational Economic
Relations § 6.7(B) at 242-44 (West 4th ed 2002).
50 See Jackson, Davey, and Sykes, eds, LegalProblems at 242 (cited in note 49).
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take "reasonable measures" to seek compliance. 51 To the extent that the second
interpretation was correct, GATT could not be invoked as a matter of law to
address nonconforming state measures. 52 Several state courts in the United
States adopted the first interpretation by finding that GATT, as part of federal
law, prevails over conflicting state laws. 53
The Uruguay Round negotiators attempted to address the inherent
ambiguities in Article XXIV:12 by adopting an Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994. With respect to Article XXIV:12, the Understanding provides that "[e]ach
Member is fully responsible under the GATT 1994 for the observance of all
provisions of GATT 1994, and shall take such reasonable measures as may be
available to it to ensure such observance by regional and local governments and
authorities within its territory. ' 54 The Understanding also makes clear that the
provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding "may be invoked in respect
of measures affecting its observance taken by regional or local governments or
authorities within the territory of a Member. '55
While the Understanding on Article XXIV:12 clarifies the responsibility of
all GATT/WTO federal nation-states for the nonconforming behavior of their
component units under the GATT/WTO, it leaves open the question of what
constitutes "reasonable measures" to seek compliance. This is a particularly
important question to consider in areas that fall within exclusive state or
provincial authority. Four GATT panels have addressed Article XXIV:12, but
none have provided any significant guidance on the interpretation of this key
phrase. The first panel decision in Canada-Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold
Coins56 was never adopted and devoted much of its discussion to the issue of
nation-state responsibility for nonconforming provincial measures. At issue was
an Ontario sales tax on gold coins which applied uniformly to all gold coins
except those minted in Canada, which were exempt from the tax. The Panel
ruled that the tax violated GATT's National Treatment article.57
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Hawaii v Ho, 41 Hawaii 565, 573 (1957) (holding that Hawaii territorial law requiring
signage indicating sale of foreign eggs contravenes GATT national treatment obligation); KS.B.
Technical Sales Corp v North Jersy D Water Supply Commn, 381 A2d 774, 778-89 (1977)
(recognizing GATT as superior to conflicting state law but finding no conflict between local
measure and GATT obligations).
54 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, 13, 33 ILM 1161, 1163 (Apr 15, 1994).
55 Id, 14.
56 GA'JT, Report of the Panel, Canada--Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins, L/5863 (Sept 17,
1985).
57 Id, 72.
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With respect to Canada's obligation under Article XXIV:12, the Panel
found that Canadian domestic law was unresolved as to whether taxation of
coinage was within the jurisdiction of the provinces or the federal government.
Nevertheless, Canada still had an Article XXIV:12 obligation to take "reasonable
measures" to ensure provincial compliance. As to what constitutes "reasonable
measures" under Article XXIV:12, the petitioner argued that Canada could
simply refer the matter to its Supreme Court under its reference procedure to
determine jurisdiction over coinage. The Panel essentially evaded the issue,
ruling that it could not determine whether reference of the issue to the Canadian
Supreme Court constituted a "reasonable measure" under Article XXIV:12.
The second Panel decision involved a claim by the United States regarding
certain practices of Canadian provincial liquor boards which allegedly violated
GATT's National Treatment provisions. In this case, the Panel concluded that
the provincial practices violated GATT Article 111:4.58 With respect to Canada's
obligations under Article XXIV:12, the Panel provided the most incisive, yet
ultimately insufficient, look at what constitutes "reasonable measures" to ensure
provincial observance. The Panel ruled that Canada "would have to show that it
had made a serious, persistent and convincing effort to secure compliance by the
provincial liquor boards with the provisions of the General Agreement." 59 The
Panel ultimately concluded that Canada did not take "reasonable measures," but
it failed to discuss what would constitute a sufficiently "serious, persistent and
convincing effort" to comply with Article XXIV:12. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
what could possibly constitute such an effort where the subject matter falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial entity at issue.
The last Panel to look at Article XXIV:12 involved a claim by Canada with
respect to excise taxes levied on imported beer and wine by the United States
federal government and numerous state governments. In United States-Measures
Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, the Panel found that the taxes violated the
national treatment obligations of GATT Article 111:2.60 In contrast to its
position in the prior Canadian alcoholic beverages dispute, the United States
argued that Article XXIV:12 provides a limitation on the duty of federal nation-
states to bring local laws into compliance. Canada countered with the argument
58 GATT, Report of the Panel, Canada-Iport, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by
Provincial Markeing Agencies, 6.2, DS17/R-39S/27 (Feb 18, 1992). This complaint followed an
earlier decision involving a similar claim asserted by the European Community. See GATT,
Report of the Panel, Panel on Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial
MarkeingAgendes, L/6304-35S/37 (Mar 22, 1988).
59 GATT, Report of the Panel, Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by
ProvindalMarketingAgendes, 5.37, DS17/R-39S/27 (cited in note 58).
60 GAIT, Report of the Panel, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages 6.1,
DS23/R-39S/206 (June 19, 1992).
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that the United States had broad constitutional authority to preempt state law
and therefore compel state adherence to GATT. Addressing United States law,
the Panel concluded that the United States had the constitutional authority to
preempt state law in this field, and that the United States failed to take
"reasonable measures" to ensure observance by the states of GATT obligations.
Perhaps as a response to the GATT Panel conclusion in United States-
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, the United States' implementation of
its obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements addresses the issue of
GATT/WTO preemption of state laws. The Statement of Administrative Action
submitted with the Uruguay Round implementing legislation specifically declares
that "[t]he Uruguay Round agreements do not automatically 'preempt' or
invalidate state laws that do not conform to the rules set out in those
agreements-even if a dispute settlement panel were to find a state measure
inconsistent with such an agreement." 61 While this declaration is binding federal
law, it nevertheless should be considered in light of the political circumstances
needed to secure domestic support to enter into the Uruguay Round
Agreements, which many argued was an unprecedented, unconstitutional
surrender of national sovereignty. The full impact of this declaration remains to
be seen; nevertheless, it adds to the difficulty posed by the continuing ambiguity
of Article XXIV:1 2.
All of these unresolved issues pose a significant challenge for WTO
Members as the trade agenda increasingly reaches areas involving subfederal
conduct. Although the United States has made significant progress regarding
state observance of the GATT/WTO-including obtaining consent from
almost forty states to enter into the Agreement on Government Procurement
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services-the Doha Round trade
agenda poses new and more difficult challenges that must be considered in order
to avoid trade distortions.
B. NAFTA REGULATION OF FEDERAL PARTIES
NAFTA's regulation of its federal parties is markedly different from, but
ultimately equally as troublesome, as the GATT/WTO approach. NAFTA
Article 105 provides that "[t]he Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures
are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement, including
their observance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and
provincial governments. ' 62 NAFTA Article 105 replicates Article 103 of the
61 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action B.1.e., in HR Doc
No 316, 103d Cong, 2d Sess at 670 (Sept 27, 1994) (hereinafter GATT/WTO SAA).
62 NAFTA, art 105 (cited in note 15).
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Canada-United States: Free-Trade Agreement ("CFTA").63 The NAFTA article
seeks to remove any doubt regarding the responsibility of federal governments
to take remedial measures to ensure subfederal compliance with the substantive
provisions of the agreement. In this regard, the article intentionally avoids the
weaker "all reasonable measures" language contained in the original GATT, in
favor of the stronger "all necessary measures" obligation. Mexico originally
proposed the "all necessary measures" language during the GATT negotiations
but withdrew it in response to complaints from federal nation-states.
NAFTA's "all necessary measures" language has not been subject to
challenge in a NAFTA dispute settlement panel. It remains unclear how Article
105 will apply to the federal systems of the United States and Canada. The
obvious and easy situation is where a state or provincial measure treads upon
federal authority. In that instance, Article 105 unambiguously requires the
federal government to exert its authority to eradicate the measure or otherwise
bring it in compliance. Because the subject matter of the measure falls within
federal jurisdiction, "all necessary measures" could be interpreted to require the
central government to bring suit to force a recalcitrant state or provincial
government to conform.
The more complicated question arises when the nonconforming state or
provincial measure falls within an area of state or provincial competence. Is the
NAFTA Party required to amend its constitution to ensure observance? If that
were the solution, then no sovereign nation would ever enter into a trade
agreement. Outside of a constitutional amendment, what other measures are
available to a federal government to rein in a recalcitrant state or provincial
government? To the extent that nothing can be done, the NAFTA Party will
certainly owe compensation or face retaliation from the affected Party. While
compensation or retaliation is certainly a valid remedy, it is not an efficient way
to address a crack in the international regulatory system. Potential solutions to
this quandary will be addressed in Section V, below.
This regulatory problem is not generally perceived as a major issue in the
United States because of federal predominance over foreign affairs and
commerce. However, federal predominance in this area is not a foregone
conclusion, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court precedent. Moreover,
as noted in the context of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the United States'
implementing legislation and Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA")
submitted in connection with NAFTA indicate that "NAFTA does not
automatically 'preempt' or invalidate state laws that do not conform to
NAFTA's rules-even if a NAFTA dispute settlement panel were to find a state
63 Canada-United States: Free Trade Agreement, art 103, 27 ILM 281, 293 (1989).
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measure inconsistent with the NAFTA." 64 Unlike the state court decisions
referenced in note 53, above, the only decision regarding preemption of state law
in the context of a regional trade agreement reached a different result.
The Third Circuit case Troan Technologies, Inc v Pennsylvania involved the
CFTA, which contains provisions analogous to those in NAFTA. 65 At issue was
the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, which conflicted with the
provisions of the CFTA. The Court considered Section 102 of the United
States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act,66 which, unlike the
NAFTA implementing legislation, provides that the CFTA prevails over
conflicting state laws.67 Despite the nonpreemption language of the CFTA, the
Court ruled that the statute was not preempted because the CFTA did not
expressly mention "buy-American" statutes and because similar statutes are
maintained by the provinces in Canada. 68 While the continuing efficacy of this
specific holding is doubtful in the context of NAFTA's government
procurement rules, it is noteworthy for the Court's failure to recognize
preemption despite the unambiguous language of the relevant implementing
legislation.
Canada's constitutional system provides a ripe atmosphere for disputes
under Article 105 in light of its unique, and unsettled, distribution of foreign
affairs and commerce power. An interesting question is whether the federal
government would be required to utilize the Canadian reference procedure to
refer the issue to the Canadian Supreme Court for a determination of which
branch of government has authority over that particular subject matter. As noted
in Section IV.A., above, this issue was addressed but not resolved in the context
of the GATT federal clause in the rejected GATT panel decision in Canada--
Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins. The more likely result is that a dispute
settlement panel will simply refuse to rule on what "necessary measures" should
be taken and simply order compensation or retaliation for failure to comply.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While admittedly neither the NAFTA nor the WTO trade systems are
facing an epidemic of nonconforming state and provincial measures,
64 The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Statement of Administrative
Action B.l.e., in HR Doc No 159, 103rd Cong, 1st Sess at 458 (Nov 4, 1993) (hereinafter
NAFTA SAA).
65 916 F2d 903 (3d Cir 1990).
66 Pub L 101-207, § l(b), 103 Stat 1833, codified at 19 USC § 2112 (2000) (hereinafter CFTA
Implementing Act).
67 Trojan Technologies, 916 F2d at 906. See also CFTA Implementing Act Title 1, Sec 102(b)(1)
(cited in note 66).
68 Trojan Technologies, 916 F2d at 907.
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globalization and the progression of world trade into areas regulated at the
subfederal level provide state and provincial governments with a greater ability
to impact trade liberalization, both positively and negatively. NAFTA Article 105
contains stronger language than GATT Article XXIV:12 with respect to
supranational regulation of subfederal governmental behavior. At the end of the
day, however, neither Article can adequately address measures that fall outside
federal competence. For example, even though it can be construed as a
"necessary measure," it is almost unthinkable that a sovereign nation-state will
amend its constitutional structure to ensure state or provincial compliance with
an international treaty. Even the stronger "all necessary measures" language
insufficiently addresses this issue and there is very little chance that any language
could ensure conformity by a recalcitrant state or provincial government that is
acting within the limits of its constitutional authority.
Because "forced compliance" is not really an option in this situation, one
solution is to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of nonconformity through
"encouraged or educated compliance." This approach seeks to decrease the
likelihood of nonconforming protectionist behavior by giving the local
governments a stake in the agreement. As it stands now, many local entities feel
estranged from the trade process and therefore have no incentive to comply.
This is especially true because the local entities feel the brunt of the negative
effects of trade liberalization (for example, job losses). The mechanism for this
internal domestic approach is providing increased input in negotiations,
increased involvement in implementing legislation, and a larger role in the
administration of the trade disciplines impacting state and provincial measures.
69
The United States adopted this approach in a formal regulatory framework
for state education and participation in international trade. The regulatory
mechanism is the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee ("IGPAC"),
which consists of approximately thirty-five members representing the states and
other nonfederal entities.70 The IGPAC dates back to the 1974 Trade Act l and
works directly with the Office of the United States Trade Representative
("USTR") "to provide overall policy advice on trade policy matters that have a
significant relationship to the affairs of state and local governments within the
69 See Matthew Schaefer, Note on State Involvement in Trade Negotialions, the Development of Trade
Agreement Implementing Legislation, and the Administration of Trade Agreements, in Jackson, Davey,
and Sykes, eds, Legal Problems § 3.6(D) at 137-39 (cited in note 49).
70 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Charter of the Intergovernmental Policy
Advisory Committee, enacted pursuant to 19 USC § 2155(c)(2), as amended, available online at
<http://www.fido.gov/facadatabase/charters/1325.pdf> (visited Oct 9, 2004).
71 See 19 USC § 2101 et seq.
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jurisdiction of the United States."'72 The IGPAC meets with US trade negotiators
throughout trade negotiations to receive updates and to offer advice.
During the GATT/WTO and NAFTA negotiations, the United States
federal government provided the states with an enormous amount of
information, both to keep them abreast of the negotiations and to ensure their
agreement with the various agreements impacting areas within state or provincial
control. While this approach worked remarkably well with respect to the
GATT/WTO Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Government Procurement, and Services Agreements, it achieved less success
with NAFTA's supplemental labor and environmental side agreements.
Several additional domestic achievements were reached in the NAFTA
implementing legislation and accompanying SAA. First, an additional process for
federal-state consultation was created. As required by the NAFTA implementing
package, the USTR appointed a "NAFTA Coordinator for State Matters" to act
as a single contact responsible for distribution of information to the states. 73
Second, the USTR is charged to keep states involved "to the greatest extent
possible in the development of U.S. positions with respect to issues subject to
state jurisdiction that are addressed by the various committees and working
groups established by the NAFTA.' ' 74 This second directive represents the first
time states were "guaranteed" a right to be informed and to participate in trade
negotiations. 75 Similar legislation and directives are contained in the Uruguay
Round implementing legislation and accompanying SAA. 76
Despite the achievements reached by the United States with respect to state
education and participation in the negotiation and implementation of
international trade agreements, the system is inherently flawed because it is
limited to advice. The states have no veto power and no ability to submit
binding advisory opinions in areas where they have constitutional authority. As it
stands now, the states are asked to voluntarily agree to commitments in these
areas. This approach is inefficient, at best, and trade distorting, at worst, because
it allows states to commit in areas on a piecemeal basis. To obtain a single
commitment or undertaking by states in all areas, a different and more "state-
empowering" approach may be needed.
As of now, the issues presented in this Article remain more of an academic
exercise than a political or economic necessity. However, to the extent the trade
process continues to move in more diverse areas, subnational barriers to trade
72 Id.
73 See NAFTA SAA B.1.e., in HR Doc No 159 at 459 (cited in note 64).
74 Id at 460.
75 See Schaefer, 23 Can-US LJ at 485 (cited in note 9).
76 See GATT/WTO SAA B.l.e., in HR Doc No 316 at 670-75 (cited in note 61).
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will increase and may become the last outlet of protectionism. At that time, both
the multilateral and regional trade regimes must face the tension and current
ambiguities in international regulation of federal nation-states.
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